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SOMETIMES YOU’RE IN, SOMETIMES 
YOU’RE OUT: UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S 
DEFINITION OF “THE PEOPLE” IN UNITED 
STATES v. PORTILLO-MUÑOZ 
Abstract: On June 29, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
in United States v. Portillo-Muñoz, upheld a federal statute prohibiting fire-
arms possession by undocumented immigrants by concluding that un-
documented immigrants are not part of “the people” granted Second 
Amendment rights. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit created an unprece-
dented distinction between types of constitutional rights and used that dis-
tinction to determine those to whom the rights apply. This Comment ar-
gues that courts should be wary of creating categories of constitutional 
rights, since such categories invite arbitrary classifications and allow legisla-
tures to grant benefits to some people and not others. 
Introduction 
 The definition of “the people,” a term used frequently in the Bill 
of Rights, shapes the rights of noncitizens living in the United States.1 If 
noncitizens are included within the Constitution’s definition of “the 
people,” they receive the same protections of individual liberties and 
freedoms as citizens.2 In 2011, in United States v. Portillo-Muñoz, a panel 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal stat-
ute prohibiting firearms possession by undocumented immigrants by 
concluding that undocumented immigrants are not part of “the peo-
ple” granted Second Amendment rights.3 
 This Comment examines recent approaches to defining “the peo-
ple” protected by the Bill of Rights and considers how the exclusion of 
undocumented immigrants from Second Amendment rights in Portillo-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909, 910 (1991). For the 
purposes of this Comment, the terms “noncitizens” and “undocumented immigrants” de-
scribe people often referred to as “aliens” or “illegal aliens.” See Victor C. Romero, The 
Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classifications 
After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 Or. L. Rev. 425, 426 n.4 (1997) (discussing 
the propriety and implications of word choice). 
2 See Neuman, supra note 1, at 910–12. 
3 643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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Muñoz fits with those interpretations.4 Part I provides an overview of the 
facts and procedural history of Portillo-Muñoz and introduces the Su-
preme Court’s standard of review for undocumented immigrants’ con-
stitutional challenges to federal statutes.5 Then, Part II outlines how the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have used a “substantial con-
nections” test to assess undocumented immigrants’ constitutional rights 
and discusses recent lower court decisions denying Second Amendment 
rights to this population, before examining the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
in Portillo-Muñoz.6 Finally, Part III considers the Fifth Circuit’s denial of 
Second Amendment rights to undocumented immigrants by classifying 
Second and Fourth Amendment rights as affirmative and protective 
rights, respectively.7 It then situates this approach within dominant un-
derstandings of the Bill of Rights.8 This Comment concludes that the 
Fifth Circuit’s unprecedented distinction between affirmative and pro-
tective rights imposes a categorical approach to defining “the people” 
that creates arbitrary distinctions between constitutional rights and 
strips the Bill of Rights of its intended purposes.9 
I. Portillo-Muñoz in Context 
 On July 10, 2010, in Castro County, Texas, law enforcement re-
sponded to a call, reporting that a person at a rodeo arena had a hand-
gun in his waistband.10 The responding officer arrested the man for 
unlawfully carrying a weapon.11 Armando Portillo-Muñoz, a Mexican 
citizen, had been in the United States illegally for eighteen months, 
working, paying rent, and financially supporting his girlfriend and her 
child.12 During the seven months prior, he had worked as a farmhand, 
maintaining the land and caring for the animals.13 He carried the fire-
arm to protect himself and the livestock from coyotes at the ranch.14 
 On August 31, 2010, Portillo-Muñoz was indicted by a grand jury 
for being an unlawfully present alien in possession of a firearm in viola-
                                                                                                                      
4 See infra notes 10–89 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 10–31 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 32–71 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 72–82 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 72–89 and accompanying text. 
10 Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 438. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 439; Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Criminal Appeal at 2, Portillo-Muñoz, 643 
F.3d 437 (No. 11-10086) [hereinafter Petition]. 
13 See Appellant’s Initial Brief at 6, Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d 437 (No. 11-10086). 
14 Petition, supra note 12, at 2. 
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tion of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).15 Portillo-Muñoz filed a motion to dis-
miss, arguing that the conviction would violate his Second and Fifth 
Amendment rights, but the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas denied the motion.16 In his appeal to the Fifth Circuit, 
Portillo-Muñoz again argued that the statute violates the Second and 
Fifth Amendments.17 Portillo-Muñoz challenged the portion of the 
Gun Control Act of 1968 that criminalizes possession of a firearm by an 
undocumented immigrant.18 In challenging the federal statute’s consti-
tutionality, Portillo-Muñoz asked the court to find that Second 
Amendment rights extend to undocumented immigrants.19 The court 
declined to do so, and a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed his convic-
tion, with one judge dissenting.20 
 Noncitizens, like Portillo-Muñoz, may have standing to challenge 
federal laws making alienage classifications.21 This right arose from the 
1886 U.S. Supreme Court case, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, in which the Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to undocumented immi-
grants, thereby granting them equal protection of the laws.22 Neverthe-
less, the Court has exhibited great deference to alienage classifications, 
striking them down only when they are not rationally related to a le-
gitimate government purpose.23 For example, in 1976, in Mathews v. 
Diaz, the Supreme Court held that Congress may differentiate between 
citizens, noncitizens, and different subsets of noncitizens in the interest 
of foreign relations and “changing political and economic circum-
                                                                                                                      
15 Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 439; Petition, supra note 12, at 2; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) 
(2006). 
16 Appellant’s Initial Brief, supra note 13, at 3–4. Portillo-Muñoz entered a conditional 
guilty plea subject to appeal of the denial, and the district court sentenced him without an 
opinion. See Petition, supra note 12, at 2–3. 
17 Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 439. The court rejected Portillo-Muñoz’s Fifth Amend-
ment challenge, holding that his conditional guilty plea reserved his right to appeal only 
as it related to the federal statute’s violation of his Second Amendment rights. Id. at 442. 
18 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5). The statute specifically prohibits possession of any firearm or 
ammunition in interstate commerce by an “alien” who “is illegally or unlawfully in the 
United States; or . . . has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa 
. . . .” Id. Section 922(g) also prohibits firearm possession by felons, fugitives from justice, 
unlawful users of a controlled substance, the mentally ill, dishonorably discharged veter-
ans, individuals subject to a restraining order for representing a “credible threat” to an 
intimate partner or child’s physical safety, convicted domestic violence perpetrators, or 
those who have renounced U.S. citizenship. See id. § 922(g)(1)–(9). 
19 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 439. 
20 Id. at 441–42; see id. at 442–43 (Dennis, J., dissenting). 
21 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
22 See id. 
23 See infra notes 24–26 and accompanying text. 
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stances.”24 As a result, since Mathews, courts have generally evaluated 
challenges to federal statutes’ alienage classifications, like Portillo-
Muñoz’s challenge to section 922(g)(5), using rational basis review.25 
 In such inquiries, a statute’s constitutionality often depends on 
whether noncitizens are protected by a constitutional amendment, 
thereby limiting the government’s power to infringe on conferred 
rights.26 It is unclear, however, whether the Framers intended “the peo-
ple” to include anyone physically present in the United States.27 Re-
flecting this uncertainty, the Supreme Court has granted Fifth, Sixth, 
Fourteenth, and some Fourth Amendment protections to both legal 
and undocumented immigrants in the United States,28 but has granted 
                                                                                                                      
24 See 426 U.S. 67, 81–83 (1976); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: 
Principles and Policies 793–94 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing Mathews as a defining case for 
the alienage classification standard of review). 
25 See Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 793–94. In contrast, in equal protection chal-
lenges to alienage classifications in state laws, courts generally apply strict scrutiny. See 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642, 643 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to New York 
State’s exclusion of aliens from public employment); Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 790; 
Romero, supra note 1, at 434, 435. Rational basis review replaces strict scrutiny at the fed-
eral level because the federal government’s interest in protecting national security and 
regulating borders trumps the interest in protecting noncitizens as a “discrete and insular 
minority” who lack voting power. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 84–85; Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 642, 
643; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971); Romero, supra note 1, at 435–36; 
Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National Gov-
ernment, 1977 Sup. Ct. Rev. 275, 278, 316. 
26 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990); Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 214 (1982). The First, Second, and Fourth Amendments reference a “right 
of the people,” and the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reference rights retained by or 
reserved to “the people,” respectively. See U.S. Const. amends. I, II, IV, IX, X. The remain-
ing amendments grant rights implicitly to those to whom the Constitution applies. See, e.g., 
id. amends. VII, VIII. 
27 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the 
Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1521, 1527, 1533 (2010); Neuman, supra note 1, at 
912–13. 
28 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984) (implying that undocu-
mented immigrants in the United States may have Fourth Amendment rights); Plyler, 457 
U.S. at 211–12, 230 (affirming that undocumented immigrants are guaranteed Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment due process protections, and holding that they are protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (holding that a noncitizen with a valid work permit had Fourth 
Amendment rights and noting tension between the federal interest in border protection and 
such constitutional rights); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (stating 
that a lawful permanent resident noncitizen is a “person” within meaning of Fifth Amend-
ment); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that any person, in-
cluding an undocumented immigrant within U.S. territorial jurisdiction is entitled to Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment protections); Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 (holding that noncitizens within 
U.S. territorial jurisdiction are “persons” within the Fourteenth Amendment because its pro-
visions are “universal”). 
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First Amendment rights only to resident, documented immigrants.29 
Further, the Court has held that noncitizens need not receive the same 
federal benefits as citizens.30 With regard to welfare benefits, for exam-
ple, Congress may treat citizens, noncitizens, and subsets of noncitizens 
differently.31 
II. Development of the Substantial Connections Test and its 
Application to the Second Amendment 
A. The Supreme Court’s Substantial Connections Test 
 In 1990, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court set 
forth a “substantial connections” test for determining whether a consti-
tutional right extends to a noncitizen.32 Although the case arose out of 
a Fourth Amendment challenge, the opinion noted that the term “the 
people” shares the same meaning across the First, Second, Fourth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.33 The substantial connections test pro-
vides that noncitizens receive certain constitutional protections when 
they have entered the United States and have “developed substantial 
connections with this country.”34 Using this analytical framework, the 
Court held that a noncitizen who was apprehended in Mexico and 
transported to the United States for detention did not have Fourth 
Amendment rights to his property abroad because he had no voluntary 
attachment to the United States.35 Although the Court employed the 
substantial connections test to reach its holding, the test did not com-
mand a majority of the justices.36 Thus, Verdugo-Urquidez holds ambigu-
                                                                                                                      
 
29 See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that resident noncitizens 
have First Amendment rights); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 
(1904) (holding that an undocumented immigrant is not entitled to First Amendment 
speech and press rights because of illegal entry). 
30 Mathews, 426 U.S. at 78. 
31 See id. at 80; see also Linda A. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the 
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 955, 984 (discussing the 
variability of rights afforded to undocumented immigrants). 
32 See 494 U.S. 259, 265, 271 (1990). 
33 See id. at 265. A plurality of the Court defined “the people” as “a class of persons who 
are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection 
with this country to be considered part of that community.” Id. 
34 See id. at 265, 271. 
35 Id. at 262, 274–75. 
36 See id. at 261 (listing the justices’ votes and opinions). Justice Anthony Kennedy, who 
joined the plurality opinion, wrote separately to propose a broader view: that Fourth 
Amendment protections should extend to all people in the United States. See id. at 276 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice John Paul Stevens, who concurred in the 
80 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
ous precedential value.37 Nevertheless, it limited the rights of nonciti-
zens and detainees residing outside the United States; further, it estab-
lished the substantial connections test, a potential tool for lower courts 
to employ when assessing the constitutional rights of noncitizens lo-
cated in U.S. territory.38 
 In 2006, in Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, the Fifth Circuit used Ver-
dugo-Urquidez to protect a noncitizen’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
rights against false imprisonment and use of excessive force.39 The court 
noted that the substantial connections test may not be binding and de-
clined to determine whether Verdugo-Urquidez controlled.40 Instead, it 
concluded that the plaintiff would meet both the Verdugo-Urquidez plu-
rality’s substantial connections test and the Verdugo-Urquidez concur-
rence’s broader definition encompassing all people within U.S. borders 
because the nature and duration of the plaintiff’s contacts constituted 
sufficient connections and because the plaintiff was in the United States 
when she was stopped.41 
B. The Substantial Connection Test Applied to Second Amendment Analysis 
 Both the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have used the Ver-
dugo-Urquidez analysis to define “the people” to whom Second Amend-
ment rights apply.42 In 2001, in United States v. Emerson, the Fifth Circuit 
addressed the meaning of “the people” in a U.S. citizen’s Second 
Amendment challenge to the Gun Control Act.43 The court first noted 
that the phrase “the people” shares the same meaning in the First, Sec-
                                                                                                                      
judgment, contended that lawfully present noncitizens are among “the people” entitled to 
Bill of Rights protections. See id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
37 See United States v. Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1260 (D. Utah 2003) 
(noting the confusion and treating the “substantial connections” test as binding). 
38 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 272–73. The Court suggested that it might have 
extended Fourth Amendment protections had the respondent been an undocumented 
immigrant who was voluntarily in the United States and who had accepted some societal 
obligations and formed a voluntary attachment. See id. at 272–73. 
39 See 459 F.3d 618, 620, 625 (5th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff was a Mexican resident who 
visited the United States once a month to assist her aunt. See id. at 620. She normally held a 
valid visitor visa but was waiting for a new card and using an interim stamp when she was 
stopped by U.S. border patrol. Id. 
40 See id. at 624–25, 626. 
41 See id. 
42 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–81 (2008); United States v. Em-
erson, 270 F.3d 203, 227–29 (5th Cir. 2001). 
43 See 270 F.3d at 212, 228 (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2006), which prohibits 
firearm possession by anyone subject to a court restraining order and who represents a 
credible physical threat to a child or intimate partner). 
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ond, and Fourth Amendments.44 It then adopted the sufficient connec-
tions language in Verdugo-Urquidez.45 But the Fifth Circuit also indicated 
that “the people” refers to “individual Americans,” potentially limiting 
the group encompassed by the term.46 Although the court defined “the 
people” to include the defendant, it nonetheless upheld the limitation 
on the defendant’s Second Amendment rights.47 In drawing this con-
clusion, the court reasoned that Second Amendment rights may be lim-
ited by “narrowly tailored” exceptions such as the one at issue.48 
 In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court clarified 
the scope of Second Amendment rights and addressed, in part, the 
group encompassed by “the people.”49 The Court held that a local stat-
ute banning handgun possession in the home violated the Second 
Amendment; further, it held that the Second Amendment confers an 
individual right to self-defense and to keep and bear arms.50 Referenc-
ing Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court concluded that the term “the people” in 
the Second Amendment “unambiguously refers to all members of the 
political community, not an unspecified subset.”51 
 Like the Fifth Circuit in Emerson, the Supreme Court in Heller 
made a “strong presumption” that Second Amendment rights “be-
long[] to all Americans”; the Heller Court also described the rights as 
applying to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”52 Additionally, the Court 
recognized “longstanding” limitations on Second Amendment rights, 
such as the prohibition on granting these rights to felons and the men-
tally ill.53 Further, the Court reasoned that statutory restrictions limiting 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. at 227–28. 
45 See id. at 228. 
46 See id. at 229; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 581 (using the same terminology seven years 
later). 
47 See Emerson, 270 F.3d at 228, 260. 
48 See id. at 260, 261. 
49 See 554 U.S. at 579–81; see also Gulasekaram, supra note 27, at 1530–32 (noting the 
Heller Court’s discussion of “the people” and the implications of its word choices). 
50 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
51 Id. at 580; see Gulasekaram, supra note 27, at 1536 (suggesting that the Heller Court 
intended to limit Verdugo-Urquidez’s “community” by replacing “national” with “political”); 
see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (defining “the people” as “a class of persons who 
are part of a national community”). 
52 Heller, 554 U.S. at 581, 635. The dissent argued that the majority’s definition of “the 
people” as “law-abiding, responsible citizens” narrowed the term such that it cannot share 
a meaning across the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments because this reading ex-
cludes people, such as felons, who are otherwise entitled to First and Fourth Amendment 
rights. See id. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Emerson, the Fifth Circuit engaged in simi-
lar semantic narrowing. See 270 F.3d at 229; Gulasekaram, supra note 27, at 1530–31. 
53 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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Second Amendment rights are “presumptively lawful,” but it did not 
define the category of constitutionally acceptable statutory measures.54 
Accordingly, Heller neither explicitly resolved whether “the people” in 
the Second Amendment encompasses noncitizens who may meet the 
Verdugo-Urquidez substantial connections test, nor defined the extent to 
which Second Amendment rights can be statutorily limited.55 
C. Lower Courts’ Treatment of Section 922(g)(5) 
 After Verdugo-Urquidez and Heller, a number of lower courts outside 
the Fifth Circuit addressed whether noncitizens in the United States have 
Second Amendment rights.56 In challenges to the constitutionality of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), these courts consistently concluded that the statute is 
constitutional as applied to undocumented immigrants because they are 
not part of “the people” under the Second Amendment.57 Even when 
courts have theorized that undocumented immigrants could have Sec-
ond Amendment rights, these courts have found that section 922(g)(5) 
permissibly restricts these rights, given Heller’s presumption that long-
standing or “historically justified” measures regulating firearms are law-
ful.58 This issue did not appear before a federal appeals court until the 
Fifth Circuit addressed it in Portillo-Muñoz.59 
D. The Fifth Circuit’s Novel Approach in Portillo-Muñoz 
 In 2011, in Portillo-Muñoz, a Fifth Circuit panel upheld a portion of 
the Gun Control Act against an undocumented immigrant’s Second 
                                                                                                                      
54 See id. at 626–27 & n.26. Since Heller, no part of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has been held 
unconstitutional on Second Amendment grounds. United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 924 
(8th Cir. 2010). 
55 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26; Gulasekaram, supra note 27, at 1532, 1536 (dis-
cussing the Heller Court’s unclear use of the term “citizen” in relation to Verdugo-Urquidez). 
56 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Guillen, No. 2:10cr192-MEF, 2011 WL 588350, at 
*2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 12, 2011); United States v. Luviano-Vega, No. 5:10-CR-184-BO, 2010 WL 
3732137, at *2, *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2010); United States v. Yanez-Vasquez, No. 09-40056-
01-SAC, 2010 WL 411112, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2010). 
57 See, e.g., Martinez-Guillen, 2011 WL 588350, at *2 (concluding that Second Amend-
ment rights extend only to citizens “comprising the American political community”); Luvi-
ano-Vega, 2010 WL 3732137, at *2, *3 (finding that no precedent recognizes undocu-
mented immigrants’ right to bear arms and that Congress has power to adopt policies 
affecting noncitizens differently than citizens); Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *2 (rea-
soning that undocumented immigrants are not among “the people” with Second Amend-
ment rights). 
58 See Martinez-Guillen, 2011 WL 588350, at *2; Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *3. 
59 643 F.3d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 2011); see Gulasekaram, supra note 27, at 1531. 
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Amendment challenge on four grounds.60 First, like the lower courts 
that previously addressed the issue, the Fifth Circuit found that Heller’s 
definition of “the people” as “all Americans,” “all members of the po-
litical community,” and “law-abiding, responsible citizens” does not en-
compass undocumented immigrants.61 Second, the court rejected the 
proposition that Verdugo-Urquidez’s definition of “the people” encom-
passes undocumented immigrants.62 Third, the court stated that, even 
if Portillo-Muñoz met the Verdugo-Urquidez substantial connections test 
and therefore fit within “the people” granted Fourth Amendment 
rights, he still would not have Second Amendment rights because the 
phrase “the people” carries different meanings in the Second and 
Fourth Amendments.63 Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Con-
gress has the authority to distinguish between noncitizens and citizens 
in lawmaking, and therefore the statute was constitutional.64 
 The Fifth Circuit’s approach mirrored that of the district courts 
before it in reading the Heller language as excluding undocumented 
immigrants from “the people” afforded Second Amendment rights.65 
But, the Fifth Circuit diverged from the district courts in its subsequent 
arguments.66 The lower courts, in accounting for the possibility that 
undocumented immigrants might have Second Amendment rights, 
looked to Heller’s open-ended affirmation of “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures” to conclude that section 922(g)(5) is a valid re-
striction on Second Amendment rights.67 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit 
discussed Heller’s definition of “the people” as “citizen[s],” but not 
whether section 922(g)(5) is presumptively lawful.68 Instead, the court 
validated the statutory exclusion of undocumented immigrants from 
Second Amendment rights in part by creating a distinction between 
types of constitutional rights.69 In describing this distinction, the court 
categorized the Fourth Amendment as granting protective rights against 
                                                                                                                      
60 See 643 F.3d at 440–42. 
61 See id. at 440. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 440–41. 
64 See id. at 441, 442; see also supra text accompanying notes 24–25 (discussing the Su-
preme Court precedent permitting such distinctions). 
65 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440; see also, e.g., Martinez-Guillen, 2011 WL 588350, at 
*2 (relying on Heller’s language to exclude undocumented immigrants from “the people”); 
Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *2–3 (same). 
66 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–42; infra notes 67–69 and accompanying text. 
67 See Martinez-Guillen, 2011 WL 588350, at *2 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26); 
Yanez-Vasquez, 2010 WL 411112, at *3. 
68 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41. 
69 See id. at 440–41, 442. 
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government abuses and the Second Amendment as granting affirmative 
rights which could be extended to fewer groups.70 Reasoning that the 
purposes of some rights merit more limited application, the court con-
cluded that who “the people” are depends on whether the types of 
rights at issue are affirmative or protective.71 
III. Implications of the Fifth Circuit’s Departure 
 The Fifth Circuit’s approach of classifying constitutional rights as 
affirmative or protective represented a significant departure from 
precedent in two ways.72 First, this approach was inconsistent with as-
sumptions underpinning the Supreme Court’s 2008 District of Columbia 
v. Heller and 1976 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez decisions, and the 
Fifth Circuit’s 2001 United States v. Emerson decision; each of those deci-
sions concluded that the term “the people” shares the same meaning 
across the Second and Fourth Amendments.73 Second, the approach 
changed the meaning of “the people” from a citizen-based to a rights-
based definition.74 This Part argues that the court’s change in ap-
proach to defining “the people” not only narrows the rights of un-
documented immigrants, but also could result in unintended conse-
quences for other constitutional rights if further utilized to define 
beneficiaries of such rights.75 
                                                                                                                     
 Heller advanced a broad, citizen-based definition of “the people” 
entitled to Second Amendment rights but acknowledged that those 
 
70 Id. at 441. 
71 See id. at 440–41. As its only source supporting this conclusion, the court cited a 
1984 case from a sister circuit. See id. at 441 (citing United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 
128–29 (2d Cir. 1984)). In 1984, in United States v. Toner, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that a predecessor statute to section 922(g)(5) did not violate an un-
documented immigrant’s Fifth Amendment equal protection rights. 728 F.2d at 128–29, 
130. The court reasoned that undocumented immigrants, and particularly the defendant 
in the case, were within the category of untrustworthy people the statute intended to pro-
hibit from possessing firearms because they “already liv[e] outside the law” and “resort to 
illegal activities to maintain a livelihood.” See id. at 128–29 (internal citation omitted). 
72 See United States v. Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2011); Petition, 
supra note 12, at 8–9. 
73 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990); United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227–28 (5th 
Cir. 2001); see also Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 444 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Fifth Circuit majority failed to recognize its Emerson precedent); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
ACLU Foundation in Support of Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1–3, Portillo-Muñoz, 643 
F.3d 437 (No. 11-10086) [hereinafter ACLU Brief] (arguing that this departure merits en 
banc review); Petition, supra note 12, at 5, 13 (same). 
74 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41; infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
75 See infra notes 83–89 and accompanying text. 
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rights could be limited by statute.76 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit fol-
lowed a rights-based approach that would exclude undocumented im-
migrants based on the nature of the rights themselves.77 The rights-
based approach contradicts Heller because it creates a framework which 
limits the constitutional rights’ applicability according to the types of 
rights they grant rather than by the definition of “the people” shared by 
the constitutional amendments employing the term.78 
 Further, the dominant reading of the Bill of Rights fails to provide a 
basis for classifying the rights it contains as affirmative or protective.79 
Many scholars believe that the Bill of Rights codified pre-existing rights 
to protect “the people,” whoever they may be, from government intru-
sion and from the political whims of a fluctuating majority.80 The Su-
preme Court has largely adopted this reading as well.81 Classifying rights 
as either affirmative or protective appears arbitrary in light of this un-
derstanding of the Bill of Rights as an affirmative codification with cau-
tionary, protective purposes.82 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 581, 635, 627 n.26; Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: 
Incorporating the Second Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 
195, 247 (2009); see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second 
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 405, 408, 413 (2009); Gulasekaram, supra note 
27, at 1531, 1532. 
77 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 441. 
78 See Petition, supra note 12, at 9–10; Blocher, supra note 76, at 414; Gulasekaram, su-
pra note 27, at 1538. The Fifth Circuit’s rejection of a shared definition across amend-
ments further reinforced this approach. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
79 See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
80 See Sotirios A. Barber, Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 651, 
651, 653 (2006) (explaining the dominant view of negative constitutionalism as protecting 
private interests); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 864, 864, 865 (1986) (discussing the historical purposes of negative rights); see also 
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1132, 1133 (1991) 
(challenging the dominant approach). 
81 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 288 (Brennan, J. dissenting) 
(arguing that the Bill of Rights focuses on what and how, not against or for whom, the 
government can act); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (rea-
soning that the Bill of Rights meant to remove certain subjects from politics). 
82 See Amar, supra note 80, at 1201. The Fifth Circuit’s particular parsing of Second 
Amendment rights as affirmative also contradicts some scholarly perspectives. See Portillo-
Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 441. Forbidding the government from “infringing” on or “depriving” 
individuals of rights, as the Second Amendment does, confers what some scholars perceive 
as negative rights (limits to government’s power) rather than positive rights (benefits, such 
as national security or the right to vote). See Barber, supra note 80, at 651; Currie, supra 
note 80, at 864–65; J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American Political and Constitutional 
Thought, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 499, 512 (2004). Following this reasoning, the Second Amend-
ment should be categorized as conferring “negative” rights, as this definition more closely 
aligns with the Fifth Circuit’s protective rights category. See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 441. 
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 The implications of this departure from precedent and creation of 
a new differentiation mechanism are significant.83 First, the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s decision greatly narrows undocumented immigrants’ constitu-
tional rights by limiting the application of the Verdugo-Urquidez substan-
tial connections test even more than Heller did.84 Second, the Portillo-
Muñoz court’s categorization of rights as either affirmative or protective 
limits Heller’s definition of “the people” by offering an additional 
mechanism for narrowing the applicability of rights.85 The Fifth Cir-
cuit’s unclear distinction between affirmative and protective rights, 
when used as a tool for narrowing the application of rights, creates the 
opportunity for unfettered judicial activism and arbitrary classifica-
tions.86 If the categories are mutually exclusive, courts will need to de-
termine which constitutional rights fall into which categories.87 Such a 
categorical view, in which the nature of particular constitutional rights 
could automatically determine their beneficiaries, could eventually 
render traditional judicial inquiry moot by pre-defining the rights.88 
The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion—that constitutional rights can be cate-
gorized and that this grouping can determine those to whom a right 
applies—would require abandoning the dominant understanding that 
the Bill of Rights serves both affirmative and protective purposes and 
would define constitutional rights more narrowly than ever before.89 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41. 
84 See Petition, supra note 12, at 10–11, 13 (describing how Portillo-Muñoz limits Verdugo-
Urquidez and Heller by adopting Heller’s “citizen” language); Gulasekaram, supra note 27, at 
1537–38 (describing how Heller limits Verdugo-Urquidez by using “citizen” language); see also 
ACLU Brief, supra note 73, at 6–7 (noting this narrowing). 
85 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 580, 581, 635; Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41. 
86 See Blocher, supra note 76, at 414–15, 437. 
87 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41; see also Blocher, supra note 76, at 382, 383 
(noting that establishing categories of rights sets a rigid framework for how to evaluate 
those rights in the future). 
88 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41; Blocher, supra note 76, at 382, 431, 437. 
89 See Portillo-Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41; see also supra notes 79–82 and accompanying 
text (discussing the dominant readings of the Bill of Rights). For example, if the Second 
Amendment is classified as affirmative but not protective, the propriety of the right of self-
defense advanced in Heller may need reconsideration. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Portillo-
Muñoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41; Petition, supra note 12, at 12. This narrowing could also have 
implications for other constitutional rights if they must be categorized as either affirmative 
or protective. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 80, at 873, 879 (implying that a number of consti-
tutional provisions, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of expression, serve both affirmative and protective purposes). 
2012 Portillo-Munoz and the 5th Circuit’s Definition of “the People” 87 
Conclusion 
 In United States v. Portillo-Muñoz, the Fifth Circuit took a novel ap-
proach in addressing whether undocumented immigrants are within 
“the people” protected by the Second Amendment. In contrast with 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, a Supreme Court decision, and United 
States v. Emerson, its own precedent, a panel of the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that the Second and Fourth Amendments confer different types 
of rights and therefore apply to different people. The Fifth Circuit’s 
categorization of constitutional amendments by the types of rights they 
grant and use of this categorization to determine the beneficiaries of 
those rights signals a departure from traditional approaches to defining 
“the people” in the constitutional amendments. As a result, Portillo-
Muñoz opens the door for arbitrary classifications of constitutional rights 
to achieve exclusions that may not otherwise have a basis in precedent. 
Moving forward, courts should be cautious about attempting to define 
constitutional rights as affirmative or protective. Doing so dilutes the 
broad and protective purposes of the Bill of Rights and challenges the 





Preferred citation: Mathilda McGee-Tubb, Comment, Sometimes You’re in, Sometimes You’re 
out: Undocumented Immigrants and the Fifth Circuit’s Definition of “The People” in United States v. 
Portillo-Muñoz, 53 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 75 (2012), http://bclawreview.org/e-supp/2012/ 
06_mcgee-tubb.pdf. 
 
INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
 
